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Abstract 
The article explores the right to leave a country, including one’s own and its relation 
to migration. Taking states’ sovereignty as a point of departure, it examines the 
correlation between the international provisions on the right to leave a country (e.g., 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966) and the methods that 
States use to control migration; such as the externalisation and closure of borders, 
increased document requirements and the criminalisation of migration. Moreover, the 
right to enter a country is critically examined as it constitutes the necessary corollary 
to the right to leave a country.  The analysis reveals a systematic violation of the 
discussed right due to the States’ fear of cross-border crime and as a demonstration 
of their sovereign power. Therefore, the data lead to the conclusion that there is a 
negative impact on people on the move, and particularly asylum refugees.       
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Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed an increased movement of people and goods across 
borders. The cheap, easy and fast means of communication and transportation 
made available by globalisation have enabled people to circulate capital, 
commodities and at the same time travel across the world. On the other hand, states 
struggle to assert their sovereignty in an ongoing globalised world, focusing their 
attention on control over migration. On that basis, the need to examine the concept 
and legal implications of freedom of movement becomes more than apparent. The 
right of freedom of movement is composed of three elements: the right to leave any 
country, including one’s own, the right to enter or return to one’s country and the 
right of everyone lawfully found within a state’s territory to enjoy the freedom of 
movement and choice of residence within its borders. 1 This paper will examine the 
right to leave any country, including one’s own. In particular, the component parts 
and exceptions of this right and its dependence on the right to enter a country will be 
explored. Finally, it will show how states’ practices of sovereignty challenge this right, 
most significantly about refugees and asylum seekers. Creation of a stricter definition 
of the permitted limitations of the right to leave a country therefore seems imperative. 
 
Sovereignty and Legal Frameworks 
As a concept of international law, sovereignty is the supreme and absolute power 
over a particular territory and persons within it. 2 Sovereign states are entitled to 
regulate aspects concerning their institutions, legislation, exercise of power over 
individuals found within their territory, and relationship with other countries. Further, 
                                                          
1
 Richard Perruchoud, ‘State sovereignty and freedom of movement’ in Brian Opeskin, Richard 
Perruchoud and Jillyanne Redpath-Cross (eds), Foundations of International Migration Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 129.  
2
Ibid 123-125. 
KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW Volume 3 2017 
 
2 
 
the fundamental aim of these states is to promote safety and security for their 
inhabitants and in parallel ensure the state’s territorial integrity. On that ground, the 
states’ interest is confined to not only control of the territory, but also control of 
movement across their borders. Attempts to control border movement and, more 
broadly, nationality, can thus be seen as states struggling to assert their sovereignty 
in one of the areas still left mostly to them. 3 
However, the state’s authority to regulate persons’ exit and entry through their 
borders is not without its limits. After World War II, a body of both universal and 
regional law was developed to articulate and protect the right of freedom of 
movement and particularly the right to leave any country, including one’s own. The 
first international instrument to recognise and set expressis verbis the right to leave a 
country was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (‘UDHR’). Article 13 
affirms that: ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country’. 4 Simply put, the UDHR acknowledges the right to leave and 
return beyond any limitations, but is not binding in itself. The international instrument 
which made the right to leave universally binding was the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966) (‘ICCPR’). 5 According to article 12, ‘Everyone shall 
be free to leave any country, including his own’. 6 The ICCPR guarantees the right in 
greater detail than UDHR while introducing certain exceptions which will be analysed 
below. The right to leave a country has been adopted by numerous specialised 
universal instruments in various contexts. More specifically, the right to leave a 
country is included in: the 1965 International Convention on Elimination of All Forms 
                                                          
3
Colin Harvey and Robert P. Barnidge, ‘Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave in 
International Law’ (2007) 19 International Journal of Refugee Law 1. 
4
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
5
 Nora Markard, ‘The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on EU Migration Control by Third Countries’ 
(2016) 27 EJIL 591. 
6
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW Volume 3 2017 
 
3 
 
of Racial Discrimination, the 1973 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
1990 International Convention for the Protection of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families. 7 Some regional instruments reinforce the right to leave in 
Europe, Africa and the Americas as well. 
As mentioned above, states seek to control migration in an endeavour to 
assert their sovereignty. To that end, governments in many cases act in a manner 
which results in them posing the gravest threat to the right to leave a country. The 
Soviet Union is such an example: while it still existed, the majority of the population 
were not allowed to leave the country, especially if they were skilled personnel or 
Soviet Jews who wanted to flee to Israel. The same applied to East Germany, where 
the well-known Berlin Wall illegally constrained persons’ liberty to leave one’s 
country. However, the right to leave a country and return is considered to be a 
‘constituent element of personal liberty’ and self-determination, 8 which is part of why 
the Soviet Union’s behaviour was so heavily criticised. And yet although there has 
been a massive international effort made to enforce this right and promote a free 
society, there is still no general right to enter a country. The implementation of the 
right depends mainly on the other state’s willingness to permit entrance into its 
territory. Unfortunately, instead of trying to enforce the exercise of the right, states 
focus their attention on blocking it. The emphasis is on control, not facilitation, of 
irregular movement. States seek to export their migration policies beyond their 
geographical borders; they attempt to criminalise particular forms of migrants and put 
                                                          
7
 Vincent Chetail, ‘Freedom of Movement and Transnational Migration’ in Thomas Alexander 
Aleinikoff and Vincent Chetail (eds), Migration and international legal norms (TMC Asser Press 2003) 
48-49. 
8
 Jack Kemp, ‘A Basic Human Right: The Right to Leave’ (1971) 31 Human Events 9. 
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pressure on third states to regulate the irregular movement of their citizens. 9 
Consequently, instead of being broadened, the right to leave a country is constantly 
being narrowed down, almost to the point of becoming an empty right. 
 
Component Parts of the Right 
The right to leave a country, including one’s own, as articulated in the ICCPR, can be 
analysed as two rights: the right to travel abroad and the right to emigrate. 10 Simply 
put, the right to leave is a broad concept which encompasses both temporary and 
long-term departures, regardless the purpose of the travel. However, following some 
commentators, the right to emigrate may, like other individual rights, be overridden 
by applications of concerted welfare when forming public policy. 11  Moreover, the 
right to leave a country entails a twofold duty on states. States ought not to 
intentionally impede departure from their land, feeding into a second duty: an 
obligation to issue the required travel documents unless there is proper reason not to 
do so. 12 The latter constitutes an explicit right which is part and parcel of the right to 
leave. Some form of identification documents is regularly required for a person to 
cross borders, often passports, the usual prerequisite travel documents considered 
to be the sine qua non of the exercise of the right to leave. 13 In some cases, other 
substitute or supplement documents may be required, such as identity cards, 
laissez-passer or tourist cards. Either way, any obstacles posed by states in 
obtaining travel documents have an immediate impact on the implementation of the 
right, and yet deliberate use of procedural obstructions constitutes the norm, as will 
                                                          
9Harvey (n3). 
10
Frederick G. Whelan, ‘Citizenship and the Right to Leave’ (1981) 75 American Political Science 
Association 636. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Chetail (n7) 55. 
13
Harvey (n3). 
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be analysed below. 14  Correspondingly, in Loubna El Ghar v. Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,15 the Human Rights Committee found that the denial to 
issue a passport for a citizen who legally applies for it, without any valid justification, 
infringes the right under Article 12(2) of the ICCPR. 16  
However, the right to leave a country does not translate into a right to enter 
another country and acquire citizenship. More importantly, the right to leave a 
country in all regional and universal instruments does not make distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens (migrants). 17 The principle of non-discrimination appears to 
be the core issue when tackling migration matters. 18 Everyone has the right to leave 
a country regardless of his or her legal status: even a person who is in an irregular 
situation or unlawfully within the territory of a signatory state is as free to leave that 
country as a national of that state. A denial of this right might amount to a violation of 
individual rights concerning freedom of personal development as well as breaching 
of Article 2 of the UDHR, which prohibits discrimination. 19 That being said, freedom 
of movement and the right to leave a country have widely been disputed: the USSR 
maintained that Article 13 of the UDHR contradicts Article 2(7) of the UN Charter as 
it constitutes a forbidden ‘intervention in issues of domestic jurisdiction’ of the 
sovereign signatory states. 20 On the other hand, many commentators have argued 
that if human rights are to be considered a matter of international law, then they are 
excluded from the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ category and therefore the ‘non-intervention’ 
                                                          
14
Perruchoud (n1) 147-148. 
15
Harvey (n3). 
16
 See Communication No. 1107/2002, Loubna El Ghar v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(Loubna El Ghar), para 2.1. 
17
Perruchoud (n1) 137. 
18
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, R. K. Jenny and Richard Perruchoud, ‘Basic Humanitarian Principles 
Applicable to Non-Nationals’ (1985) 19 Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc 556. 
19
 Rosalyn Higgins DbeQc, ‘The Right in International Law of an Individual to Enter, Stay in and Leave 
a Country*’ in Themes and Theories, Themes and Theories, chapter 30 (OUP 2009) 443. 
20
Whelan (n10). 
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demand. 21 Additionally, according to Katja Aas, the new technologies of mobility 
surveillance that States increasingly use to control the movement of population 
across their borders tend to acquire a transnational character, thereby undermining 
the concept that border control is a purely national and sovereign matter. 22 Hence, 
from a legal standpoint, it can be argued that international treaties and regional 
instruments which enunciate the right to leave a country and freedom of movement 
do not actually interfere with the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. 
 
Limitations  
General Limitations 
Having considered the parts of the right as mentioned above, it is reasonable to look 
at its exceptions, as the right to leave a country is not absolute. The first instrument 
to introduce limitations was the UDHR, which in Article 29 (2) provided that: 
 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose 
of security, due recognition and respect for the right and freedoms of 
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society. 23 
 
Accordingly, Article 12 (3) of the ICCPR authorises the States to enforce limitations 
to the right to leave a country justified by certain reasons. In particular, it allows 
exceptions to the right on the basis of protecting national security, public health and 
                                                          
21
 Ibid. 
22
Katja Franko Aas, ‘‘Crimmigrant’ bodies and bona fide travellers: Surveillance, citizenship and global 
governance’ (2011) 15 Theoretical Criminology 331.   
23
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 29 (2). 
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morals, public order (ordre public) and the rights and freedoms of others. 24 These 
grounds allow States to restrict the mobility of those considered to be criminals or 
those who do not conform to certain national or international health regulations, 
among others. 25  It should be noted that the ICCPR does not include the term 
‘general welfare’, and that ordre public is similar to public policy, while ‘public order’ 
implies the absence of physical disorder. 26  National security also constitutes a 
common ground for a State’s denial to allow the exercise of the right to exit the 
country. 27 As this is a very broad concept that encompasses various conditions 
under which this right can be limited, it has been held that a general constraint to 
leave a country is not allowed unless there is an armed conflict, public emergency or 
a particular person is ‘seriously suspected of being engaged abroad in activities 
prejudicial to the security of his or her own country’. 28 
Restrictions of human rights are in general permitted only when: (i) they are 
provided for by law, (ii) they are imposed to protect human rights and freedoms 
included in human rights treaties and defence vested state interests and (iii) required 
to achieve this goal. 29 In the face of the restrictions mentioned earlier, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) examined the right under Article 12 of the ICCPR, 
addressing some General Comments and Communications. General Comment No. 
27 in particular serves as a useful guideline to States to secure individual rights in 
practice, 30 stating that restrictions imposed on the right to leave should comply with 
the principle of proportionality. That is to say: the permissible limitations should fulfil 
                                                          
24
Perruchoud (n1) 137-139. 
25
Rosalyn Higgins (n19) 452. 
26
Ibid. 
27
Perruchoud (n1) 137-139. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
Chetail (n7) 55. 
30
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of 
Movement), 2 November 1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139c394.html [accessed 16 December 2016]. 
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a specific legitimate purpose; they should be necessary and appropriate to achieve 
this purpose; and they should be the least intrusive means among those available to 
serve it. 31 Restrictions ought to be established by the law and they ought to be 
justified by precise criteria in a non-discriminatory manner. 32 Hence, States should 
impose these restrictions bearing in mind that they must not impair the essence of 
the right and that the principle of proportionality should be respected by all 
administrative, judicial and legislative authorities in respect of this. 33 Any restriction 
that does not comply with these guidelines is contrary to the prerequisites of Article 
12(3) of the ICCPR, constitutes a violation of the protected right, and is therefore 
considered unlawful. However, States regularly impose legal and bureaucratic 
obstacles with the intention of preventing people from leaving the country. These 
measures in many cases result in unjustified violations of human rights, rendering 
thus the right to leave a country ineffective in practice. Furthermore, Article 4 of the 
ICCPR allows for further restrictions on the right: ‘limitations are also permissible in a 
public emergency where a nation’s life is threatened’. 34  When this is the case, 
States are obliged to conform to the principle of proportionality, and they must not 
deviate from their obligations under the International law. On the other hand, that 
States implement the limitations stated in the ICCPR for political reasons other than 
those permissible implies a need for a stricter definition of these exceptions in order 
to ensure the effectiveness of the right.  
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Dutch Human Rights and Foreign Policy Advisory Committee, ‘Crossing Borders: The Right to 
Leave a Country and The Right to Return’ (1988) 10 Human Rights Quarterly 138. 
33
Perruchoud (n1) 137-138. 
34
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 4. 
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Required Limitations 
The guidelines from the HRC shed some light on the essence of the right to leave a 
country and its limitations. There are some cases, however, in which the States are 
required by international law to prevent irregular or illegal movement of their citizens. 
The most significant of those is found in the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (Smuggling Protocol). 35  The aim of this 
treaty is to ‘prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants’ while at the same time 
‘protecting the rights of smuggled migrants’. 36  Particularly, when it comes to 
measures taken to prevent migrant smuggling by sea, States’ practices should be 
conducted in a manner by which the safety and the humane treatment of migrants a 
can be secured. 37 Moreover, Article 7 of the Smuggling Protocol imposes on States 
the obligation to ‘cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the 
smuggling of migrants by sea, in accordance with the international law of the sea’. 38 
Simply put, coastal States are empowered to take appropriate measures, such as 
boarding and searching vessels which may be reasonably suspected of smuggling, 
exchanging information regarding smuggling of migrants with other States, enforcing 
strict border control, and imposing checks of travel documents. 39 Still, States need 
to acquire the consent of the vessel’s flag State before they proceed with any 
measures unless there is an immediate threat to the life of persons. 40Additionally, if 
any evidence of smuggling is found during the investigation, the investigating State 
                                                          
35
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. 
36
Ibid. 
37
Randall Hansen, ‘State Controls: Borders, Refugees, and Citizenship’ in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (OUP 2014) 2. 
38
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. 
39
 Hansen (n37). 
40
Markard (n5). 
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should inform the flag State of the results as well as any measures taken. 41 Thus 
while the right to leave a country is widely articulated and protected in international 
law, its  application in law reveals a difference in approach between nationals and 
migrants. Migrants are granted the right to leave their country of sojourn unless not 
doing so can be justified by under article 12(3) of the ICCPR, while nationals can be 
subject to stricter restrictions when it comes to preventing them from leaving their 
own country by irregular means. In other words, migrants’ right to leave is 
characterised as a right to enter, while nationals’ right to leave is viewed as a right to 
leave the country of their nationality, and it is these specific aspects which are the 
subject of stricter restrictions.  However, there is concern that measures taken 
against cross-border movement are so easily justified that the restrictions on the 
right to leave can end up ‘swallowing the right’. 42 If States are left without clear 
guidance and supervision when implementing the right and its exceptions, this would 
lead to vast interference with the right, rendering it an empty gesture.  
The Right to Enter a Country 
Emphasis should also be given to the right to enter another country, which 
constitutes the inevitable corollary to the right to leave one’s country. One can safely 
say that without the reassurance of the right to enter another country, the right to 
leave (travel or emigrate) is incomplete. 43 It is therefore often argued that the 
effective exercise of the right to leave is ultimately linked to the capacity of entering 
another State. 44 Despite this, there is no general legal obligation of sovereign States 
to admit non-nationals in their territory under international law. Still, like every rule, 
this one has its exceptions as well. Firstly, as mentioned in the article 12(4) of the 
                                                          
41
 Perruchoud (n1) 273-274. 
42
 Hansen (n37). 
43
Goodwin-Gill (n18). 
44
Chetail (n7) 57. 
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ICCPR: ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’. 45 
This right is a means of strengthening the right to leave. It implies that no one shall 
be deprived of the right to return to his own country and therefore deprived of his or 
her nationality as an after-effect of leaving the country. States, in turn, have an 
obligation under customary international law to accept or re-admit their nationals. 46 
Hence, this right should be characterised more as a right to return than as a right to 
enter another state. 47 
Nationality and the Refugee Convention 
The right to a nationality has recently acquired great importance. As the current trend 
is towards the closing of borders and strict control of migration movement, 
statelessness is increasingly considered to be an intolerable position. 48 Accordingly, 
the right to return raises questions concerning the meaning of the term ‘own’ country. 
The European Convention 49 and the American Convention 50 for protecting human 
rights expressly enunciate this right only for the nationals of that State. On the other 
hand, the UDHR, the ICCPR as well as the African Charter 51 refer to ‘his country’ or 
‘his own country’ without mentioning nationality. It is widely recommended, however, 
that the term should be broadly interpreted so as to encompass everyone who 
cannot be considered as an alien to that country.  52 According to this school of 
thought, the right to return should cover not only the nationals of a State but also 
permanent residents within its territory, including migrant workers who have 
contributed to the country’s welfare for a sufficiently long period of time. 53This would 
                                                          
45
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
46
Perruchoud (n1) 129-130. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Whelan (n10). 
49
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1963). 
50
American Convention on Human Rights (1969). 
51
 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981. 
52
Chetail (n7) 57-58. 
53
 Dutch Human Rights and Foreign Policy Advisory Committee (n32). 
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follow the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, which provides that 
a stateless person who has a travel document issued by a certain State shall be free 
to enter that territory as long as the document is still valid. 54 In short, the most 
appropriate definition of ‘one’s own country’ may be one which covers every 
individual who has proof of a link with that country. However, there is no unanimous 
decision on that and the matter remains debatable. 
A further restriction to on States’ sovereignty to regulate entry into their 
territory comes from the Refugee Convention 55  and its 1967 Protocol, 56  which 
states that ‘when a person arrives at the border of a State seeking refuge, the State 
is obliged not to return the asylum seeker to the frontier of a territory where his or her 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of persecution’. 57  This is the 
principle of non-refoulement which imposes on States a duty not to expel refugees 
regardless their irregular status, if they are out of their country of nationality due to a 
well-founded fear of persecution. This duty is absolute and binding on all signatory 
members of the treaty in both peacetime and armed conflict periods. 58 Deviation is 
permitted only on the grounds of maintaining the public order and national security. 
Simply put, this principle applies either when the refugee is at the border of a State 
or within its territory, no matter if he or she is lawfully, irregularly, or without 
documentation within it. 59 Thus, the acknowledgement of this principle is closely 
connected to the right to leave a country as it ensures the security of people at risk 
by other States. It is in this manner that the right to leave becomes effective in 
practice, and the prohibition of refoulement becomes a buffer against persecution, 
                                                          
54
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954. 
55
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951. 
56
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967. 
57
Perruchoud (n1) 132-135. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid. 
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torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the state they are 
departing. 60 Consequently, preventing departure by sea, pre-departure immigration 
control, criminalising certain types of migrants, and other contemporary measures 
that States use to prevent migration movement and entrance into their territory 
constitute an interference with the effective exercise of refugees’ right to leave and a 
breach of the aforementioned Refugee Convention. 
 
Violation of the Right in Practice 
As analysed above, the right to leave a country, including one’s own, is widely 
recognised and articulated in various universal and regional instruments. The act of 
ratifying a treaty implies a general agreement on the part of the signatory States to 
respect and protect the rights under this treaty, but contemporary practice shows 
exactly the opposite occurs in reality. States use their sovereignty to justify the 
control of migration movement, imposing unjustified restrictions on human rights and 
particularly on the right to leave a country. These restrictions are unjustified because 
they are in contradiction of the process the States are meant to adhere to. 
Firstly, the freedom of States to regulate the entry of non-nationals into their 
territory is equivalent to a right to request them to leave as soon as the authorised 
permission to enter the country for a specified duration and purpose ends. 61 After 
the end of the authorised stay, States are entitled to make an expulsion order 
expelling these aliens from their territory, balancing their right of sovereignty with the 
rights granted by international law. Therefore, at this point, the right to leave a 
country turns into an obligation to leave. However, a risk assessment should take 
place before deportation to ensure that the non-refoulement principle holds in 
                                                          
60
Markard (n5). 
61
Perruchoud (n1) 143. 
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practice. 62 The latter prevents States from deporting or extraditing refugees and 
asylum seekers who are fleeing their own country due to a well-founded fear of 
persecution. Despite this, in practice, Western States have responded to this 
obligation with efforts to stop asylum seekers flows, even using drastic measures 
such as blocking access to their soil or extended deportation. 63 A recent survey in 
the USA and the UK revealed an upward trend in deportations. In the USA, 
deportations climbed from 114,432in 1997 to 400,000 in 2009, whereas in the UK, 
they rose from 30,000 to 67,000, respectively. 64 Many other States have also started 
using extensive deportation as a means to deal with illegal migration and failed 
asylum-seekers. These arbitrary deportations can - and in fact, do - lead to grave 
violations of refugees’ rights in the sense that they are prevented from effectively 
exercising their right to leave their country and seek safety in an another State. 
 Secondly, States have introduced a variety of measures attempting to keep 
migrants away from their soil, and asylum seekers away from their borders, since the 
duty to provide asylum only arises when the asylum seekers have entered the State. 
Borders are considered to be ‘a tool of exclusion’ which divide nationals from aliens 
and are broadly used to secure a State’s integrity. Additionally, the political coupling 
of migrants and crime has led to an extended closure of borders using the excuse of 
preventing cross-border crime and illegal migration. 65Scholars have suggested that 
these attempts indicate a systematic criminalisation of many migrant categories and 
a further effort to bring refugees and asylum seekers under the remit of military 
policy, leading to the creation of what has been coined ‘crimmigrant bodies’. 66 Many 
countries have developed strict surveillance methods to assist in controlling 
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 Ibid. 
63
 Randall Hansen (n37). 
64
 Hansen (n37) 6. 
65
Whelan (n10). 
66
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population movement across borders. In Europe, for instance, among other systems, 
the following databases are maintained to help secure the EU borders: the 
Schengen Information System, the Eurodac, Visa Information System, European 
Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), Registered Travellers System and others. 67 
In addition to enforcing borders already in place, States also expend every effort to 
shift the location of their borders, asserting their sovereignty outside their territory.  
This is known as the externalisation of migration control, which is defined as a 
State’s effort to curtail migrant flows, including asylum seekers, before they reach its 
borders and jurisdiction or render them legally inadmissible without any 
consideration of their individual claims for protection. 68 Borders are being enforced, 
in effect transferred, beyond the borderline. 69 An illustration of such State practices 
is Australia and its ‘Pacific Solution’, which involved certain asylum claims being 
processed extra-territorially in ‘declared safe countries’ like Papua New Guinea. As a 
result, ‘off-shore applicants’ were at the same time within and out of Australia while 
borders were in different locations for different purposes. 70 States also adopt further 
measures in an attempt to exert control over migration extra-territorially. One 
common practice is the imposition of ‘international zones’ at airports so that refugees 
cannot reach European or other countries. 71  Furthermore, they deploy liaison 
officers to prevent illegal migration and contract ‘mobility partnerships’ with third 
countries, exchanging obligations to take back irregular migrants, cooperate in 
                                                          
67
Whelan (n10). 
68
Bill Frelick, Ian M. Kysel and Jennifer Podkul, ‘The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on 
the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants’ (2016) 4 JMHS 190. 
69
 Alison Kesby, ‘ The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 101. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 Frances Nicholson, ‘Implementation of The Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987: Privatising 
Immigration Functions at the Expense of International Obligations?’ (1997) 46 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 586. 
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surveillance and prevent illegal departures of their nationals. 72 All these measures 
are highly problematic with regard to the right to leave. Refugees and asylum 
seekers have a right to leave their countries, and receiving states have an obligation 
under international law not to push them back to territories where they are in danger. 
Practically speaking, this means that the receiving states have a duty to accept 
them, so refugees and asylum seekers can also be said to have a right to enter safe 
third countries. Yet these rights are rendered a meaningless formalism by the 
frequent imposition of legal barriers, detention and push-back measures, and use of 
deportation. Whatever rights they have in theory, refugees and asylum seekers are 
increasingly left with no place to go. 
 Finally, as already explained, the right to leave a country is tied to the right to 
obtain travel documents.  Since travel documents are issued by States, this is the 
area where they impose legal and bureaucratic– as opposed to other – barriers. High 
fees, difficult-to-obtain documents, requiring application for special forms, and 
processing delays are only some of the obstacles that, according to the General 
Comment No 27, States impose to restrict their nationals leave their country. 73These 
are all violations of the right to leave. It should be noted that the most evident 
violations, politically-motivated refusals to issue travel documents, have been 
explicitly recognised as such in courts of law. In Samuel Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay, 
where Uruguayan authorities refused to renew the plaintiff’s passport, the HRC 
found that there was a violation of article 12 of the ICCPR and that ‘the authorities 
had manipulated the passport renewal to punish him for his politically subversive 
views.’ 74 These are distinct situations which allow grave violations and interference 
with one’s right to leave any country, including one’s own. This, in turn, reveals a 
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severe need to revise the legal framework of the right and reset its exception with 
precision.  
Conclusion 
In recent years, States’ desire to control migration movement across their boarders 
has become increasingly apparent. Triggered by the rise in people on the move, 
States adopt increasingly extensive packages of measures to deal with this 
movement. In the name of their sovereignty, they make use of practices that 
contradict the protected right to leave one’s country. This interference has a 
particularly adverse impact on refugees and asylum seekers, in practice depriving 
them of the right to flee their country and find protection under another safe State.  
The majority of such violations arise out of an insufficient balancing of individual and 
common interests or a disproportionate imposition of restrictions. 75  In order to 
protect this right effectively, the emphasis should be placed more on its protection 
rather than the protection of the States’ sovereignty. Moreover, a procedural 
framework to secure the active exercise of the right and stricter, more precise 
definitions of the permitted deviations of the right should be introduced. 
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